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Lorne E. Rozovsky*

New Developments in Nova
Scotia Psychiatric Legislation

1. Background
Depsite advanced developments in the treatment of mental illness,
Nova Scotia has until recently possessed some very archaic mental
health legislation. The law treated the mentally ill patient differently
depending on the institution in which he happened to be placed
regardless of his diagnosis. Patients in general hospitals for
psychiatric disorders fell within the jurisdiction of the Public
Hospitals Act, and were treated no differently than physically ill
patients. 1 Patients who were sent to the Nova Scotia Hospital, a
psychiatric institution owned by the province fell within the Nova
Scotia Hospital Act. 2 It contained provisions on compulsory and
voluntary admission, quite different from those under the Public
Hospitals Act, where compulsory admission was not possible.
The criteria for compulsory detention and treatment under the
Nova Scotia Hospital Act were broad. It was necessary for the
patient to be considered to have a mental disorder and that he should
be admitted to the Nova Scotia Hospital, either because he required
the in-patient facilities for observation, diagnosis or treatment, or
that he required care that could not adequately be provided outside
the hospital for his own health or safety, or for the protection of
others. In addition, it was necessary that the patient, in the opinion
of a medical practitioner, be certified because his mental status and
lack of insight was such that he did not understand or was unwilling
to accept the fact that he required admission to the hospital. Two
3
medical certificates stating these factors were required.
Therefore compulsory admission was effected by physicians
outside the hospital itself. There were no provisions for regular
reviews except that of a review by the hospital itself, prior to the
anniversary date of the admission. There was, however, provision
for judicial review on application.
*Lorne Elkin Rozovsky, B.A. LL.B., former Legal Counsel to the Nova Scotia
Department of Health. This paper was originally presented before a national
meeting of the Provincial Directors of Mental Health Services in St. John's
Newfoundland, on June 14, 1978.
1. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 249
2. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 210, ss. 13-21
3. Id. at s. 16
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If however, the patient was suffering from a long-term
psychiatric illness he could be committed to one of three municipal
mental hospitals and fall under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Mental Hospitals Act. 4 The criteria for admission under that act
were even broader than those under the Nova Scotia Hospital Act.
They were that the person was mentally disordered, was not a
suitable person to be admitted to the Nova Scotia Hospital and was
suitable to be admitted to a municipal mental hospital. 5 The only
check on this very broad discretion of a physician outside the
hospital was that a provincial official, the Inspector of Municipal
Mental Hospitals, had to agree to all admissions. This Act as well
had provisions for judicial review.
Neither the Nova Scotia Hospital Act nor the Municipal Mental
Hospitals Act specifically outlined any particular civil rights and as
a result the percentage of patients detained against their will was
extremely high.
As a result of these problems and certain abuses which were
uncovered by the MacKeen Royal Commission 6 it was felt
necessary to begin research into new mental health legislation. This
work commenced in 1967 and finished with the passage of
amendments to the Public Hospitals Act in 1977 and the subsequent
drafting of regulations leading up to proclamation.

II. Principles
The new psychiatric legislation is based on two principles. The first
is that legislation should treat mental illness as much as possible as
physical illness. While it is recognised that there are certain major
differences, any attempt to treat mental illness or those suffering
from it differently from the physically ill should be taken only with
extreme caution, and circumscribed with legal safeguards.
The second principle is that legislation should treat psychiatric
hospitals in the same manner as general hospitals, except where the
nature of their speciality requires unique provisions. For this reason
it was felt that there should not be a special statute dealing with
mental illness. Nor should hospitals specializing exclusively in
psychiatric disorders fall under a different statute than general
4. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 202

5. Id.at s. 11(3)
6. Report of the Royal Commission on the Halifax County Hospital, Hon. H.P.
MacKeen, Commissioner, Halifax, N.S., 1970
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hospitals. Similarly the patient being treated in the general hospital
for mental illness should not fall under different legislation than one
who is being treated in an exclusively psychiatric institution. The
adoption of this principle resulted in psychiatric legislation
becoming part of general hospital legislation. The Municipal Mental
Hospitals Act and the Nova Scotia Hospital Act were repealed, with
the exception of the corporate structure in the Nova Scotia Hospital
Act. The Public Hospitals Act was changed to a Hospitals Act, and
7
broadened.

III. Recognition of the Differences
Despite the acceptance of the above principles, it was recognized
that mental illness is not the same as physical illness. Therefore,
there are certain problems encountered by the psychiatric patient
and the institution caring for him which are not encountered by
other patients or other institutions. It was felt, however, that only
those legislative provisions which are absolutely necessary as a
result of such differences should be enacted.
Considering these differences, the first question which arose was
whether it is necessary at any time to forcibly detain persons
suffering from mental illness and to treat them against their will. It
is a widely accepted principle of law that a patient cannot be treated
without his consent. 8 To do otherwise would be an infringement of
his basic civil rights to bodily integrity. The only exception to this
rule is in an emergency where the patient is not in a condition to be
able to either refuse or consent, and where any delay would
endanger his life or health .9 This principle has long been established
by the courts. However, two other conditions have been established
in many jurisdictions throughout the world by statute. The first is a
communicable disease under which an individual, because he is a
danger to the public, can be forcibly treated against his will.
The second case is that of mental illness. The justification for
laws forcibly treating the mentally ill against their will has
traditionally rested on two beliefs. The first is that the mentally ill
are per se dangerous and therefore are in the same classification as
those suffering from communicable diseases. It is now generally
7. S.N.S. 1977, c. 45
8. Mulloy v. Hop Sang, [ 1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. S.C., App.Div.)
9. Marshall v. Curry, [1933]3 D.L.R. 260 (N.S.S.C.)

508 The Dalhousie Law Journal

accepted that a very small proportion of patients suffering from
serious psychiatric disorders are dangerous either to themselves or
to other people. The second rationale for involuntary treatment of
the mentally ill is that the patient's mind is disordered and that
therefore he does not have the mental capability of either consenting
to or refusing treatment. The rationale was that this placed him in a
different position from the cardiac patient or anyone suffering from
any physical disorder. In fact a vast number of psychiatric patients
are capable of either consenting to or refusing treatment for mental
illness. 10
However, although the two reasons upon which involuntary
treatment of the mentally ill is based have decreased in importance,
they have not totally disappeared. Some psychiatric patients are in
fact dangerous to other people. Obviously this does then place them
in the same classification as those suffering from communicable
diseases, in that legislative action must be taken in order to protect
the public. It is also recognized that some patients are not mentally
capable of determining their own course of treatment. However, the
Nova Scotia House of Assembly was not prepared to forcibly treat
individuals who were incapable of consenting simply for that reason
alone. The dangers of such an enactment are too great a threat to the
civil liberties of the citizens. Therefore, the force of law would only
be brought to bear in cases in which the individual was a danger to
his own safety, or the safety of others. One of the dangers of this
restriction is that the community may rebel against the idea of
having even non-dangerous mental patients who cannot be forcibly
treated.
Despite the fact that the grounds for forcibly treating individuals
have been considerably narrowed, the legislature took very specific
steps to protect individuals from such action where it was not
justified by law.
IV. Right to Liberty vs. MedicalNeeds
Once the principle has been established that there are situations,
however narrow, whereby an individual could be removed from
society and forcibly treated for an illness against his will, legislative
efforts were made to limit such power against the overriding right of
10. Z. M. Lebonsohn, "Problems in Obtaining Informed Consent for Electroshock Therapy" in R.C. Allen et al., ed., Readings in Law and Psychiatry
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975) at 387
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the individual to his freedom of movement and bodily integrity. On
the other hand, the Nova Scotia legislators seem also to have
accepted the principle that the citizens have, if not a right, at least a
very strong interest in receiving prompt medical and hospital
attention for their illnesses, even in situations where they do not
want such attention or are incapable of refusing or consenting to it.
In passing psychiatric legislation, it is necessary to deal with this
conflict between the right to liberty and the interest in medical care.
Many American states have taken the approach that the right to
liberty is paramount and cannot be removed without what they refer
to as the due process of law. This often entails a judicial proceeding
either with or without a jury. The result is that the medical needs of
the individual will not be met until his right to liberty has been dealt
with. I The criticism of such a procedure is that it places the family
and physician of an individual in an adversary situation when they
should be in a supportive role. It also may delay treatment, resulting
in harm and even death.
The approach in most other countries in the world, including the
United Kingdom and Canada, has been the opposite. While judicial
proceedings are provided for in most mental health acts of Canada,
the usual approach is to provide for an individual's medical needs as
quickly as possible, followed by proceedings to protect his civil
rights, including his right to liberty. This traditional Canadian
approach was not changed in the new Nova Scotia legislation.
However, the protection of the right to liberty and bodily integrity
was enforced by restricting the grounds of involuntary detention and
treatment, and by providing a complicated procedure which must be
followed commencing immediately upon the removal of such a
basic civil right. The establishment of such a priority is strictly a
political and philosophical decision and can be argued from both
sides.
V. From G. P. to Specialist
In furtherance of the principle that mental illness should be treated
as similarly as possible as physical illness, the Nova Scotia
legislation attempts to conform to the style of medical practice
generally. It recognizes that most psychiatric and physical illnesses
are treated by family physicians. If the illness becomes more
11. S. J. Brakel & R. S. Rock, eds., The Mentally Disabled and the Law
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1971) at 49
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serious, the family physician refers the patient to a specialist. The
patient may then be referred to an out-patient mental health
centre. At the next stage the specialist admits the patient to hospital
for treatment. With psychiatric illness, the preference is gradually
becoming that of a department of psychiatry in a general hospital.
As the illness becomes more serious the final stage would be
forcible detention and treatment in a psychiatric hospital. In other
words, the legislation is based on the philosophy that forcible
detention and treatment in a psychiatric hospital is the last and least
preferable of all forms of treatment and should only be employed in
extremely circumscribed situations.
VI. The Police
The police in any community are often faced with the difficulty of
dealing with an individual who is obviously suffering from mental
illness, but who may not be involved in criminal activity. Unless
legislation specifically allows the police to remove an individual to
a hospital for examination purposes, the only authority which the
police would have would be to arrest the individual under the
Criminal Code or some provincial statute. It was felt that the police
are often placed in a situation in which they must remove an
individual to a hospital without any legal authority. On the other
hand, there was the danger that if the police removed an individual
to a jail or lockup, injury and even death may result. While these
dangers were recognized, there exists the fear that power given to
the police to remove an individual to a hospital could be abused,
since the ordinary provisions of the Criminal Code would not be
available. However, on balance it was felt by many that it would be
preferable to err in the direction of removing to a hospital an
individual who should not be there and then subsequently
transferring him to a jail or lockup, rather than to place a mentally ill
person in a jail when in fact immediate medical attention may be
1 2
required.
VII. Criteriafor Committal
The basic criteria for committal under the legislation consists of two
separate concepts, both of which must be in evidence.1 3 The first is
that the individual suffers from a psychiatric disorder. Psychiatric
disorder has been defined as any disease or disability of the mind
12. Hospitals Act, S.N.S. 1977, c. 45
13. Id.at s. 34(3)
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and includes alcoholism and drug addiction. 14 Any abuses owing to
an unjustified expansion of the words "any disease or disability of
the mind" would have to be left to the medical profession. Since
there are checks and balances, such dangers would hopefully be
minimized. Also, due to the very flexible nature of psychiatry and
mental disorder, it is difficult, if not impossible, to adequately
define psychiatric disorder in more specific legislative terms.
There was considerable controversy before the Law Amendments
Committee of the House of Assembly as to whether alcoholism and
drug addiction should be included. Many psychiatrists would
consider these matters as a disease or disability of the mind in any
case, or might say that they could consist of a disease or disability of
the mind in some cases, but not in others. In order to make the
matter more certain so that alcoholics and drug addicts would not
automatically be excluded from the category, they were specifically
included by law.
The second criterion is that the person should be admitted to the
facility because he is a danger to his own safety or to the safety of
others.' 5 Similarly the word "safety" was not defined because of
the difficulty of doing so. Hopefully, the development of any
excessive practices would be controlled by the built-in review
system.
The procedure by which these criteria operate can commence in
one of three ways. The first is by two medical certificates, each
signed by a physician who has reasonable and probable grounds to
believe that the criteria exist. Such certificates must be signed
within forty-eight hours of an examination and have effect only
within seven days of the time of the signature .16
The second method is via a magistrate who, when given
information under oath by a person who has reasonable and
probable grounds to believe any person is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder and that that person is a danger to his own
safety or to the safety of others, may direct and authorize any two
physicians to examine the individual, or to issue a warrant for the
individual's apprehension for examination. The procedure then
follows the standard procedure commencing with the medical
certificates.17
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
ld. at

s.
s.
s.
s.

(q)
34(3)
28
29

512 The Dalhousie Law Journal

The third possibility is via a police officer who has reasonable
and probable grounds to believe that a person suffers from a
psychiatric disorder and is a danger to his own safety or the safety of
others, or is committing or about to commit an indictable offence.
There was an attempt in the Law Amendments Committee to restrict
the officer to taking only persons for medical examination who in
addition to being a danger was committing or about to commit an
indictable offence. The difficulty would be that an endangered
individual not committing an indictable offence could not be taken
for examination. As an additional protection every police officer
who apprehends a person under this section is required to file a full
report with the Attorney General within twenty-four hours.'
The second stage of the procedure is that the individual is then
admitted to hospital for a period of observation.1 9 Such a period
applies to all persons whether they enter hospital voluntarily or not.
During the period of observation a staff psychiatrist may make a
declaration stating that the patient suffers from a psychiatric
20
disorder and is a danger to his own safety or the safety of others. It
is this declaration which authorizes the detention of the patient for
treatment. 2 1 The declaration is valid for one month but may be
22
renewed for subsequent periods of three months and six months.
VIII. The Stigma
Despite all attempts to remove the pejorative stigma of mental
hospitals, much still remains to be done in the public relations field.
Until a change in public attitude comes about, it was necessary to
recognize the stigma that could remain with an individual for his
entire life of having been a patient in a mental hospital. While
nothing could be done about a person who was in fact a patient in a
mental hospital, concern was expressed over an individual who had
been removed to a psychiatric hospital for observation only, either
against his will or voluntarily, but who had been released and who
never had been treated as a patient. In later years, it would be unjust
for such an individual to be forced to answer a question on a visa
application or an employment form that he had been a patient in a
mental hospital when in fact he was never there for treatment. This
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at s.
Id.at s.
Id. at s.
Id.ats.
Id. at s.

30
26
34(3)
36(1)
36(2), (3)
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is the reason for the maximum seven day period of observation for
all individuals who enter hospital. During this time, the legislation
never refers to the individual as a patient, but as a person under
observation. 23 As a result, if the individual never does in fact
become a patient, he can truthfully answer questions to this effect in
the negative.
IX. Remands Under the CriminalCode
One of the problems that had been experienced in the past by
psychiatric hospitals in Nova Scotia was that of patients who were
remanded for examination by the courts under the Criminal Code
for a period of thirty days. 24 In many such cases, the patients were
assessed in a relatively short period of time, but could not be
returned to the court and thus remained in the hospital for the full
thirty day period. Since such remands fall within the Criminal Code
of Canada, they are outside the legislative jurisdiction of the
Province of Nova Scotia. Therefore, the manner in which they are
conducted cannot be changed by the Province. However, one of the
reasons that the patients remained unnecessarily in hospital was that
there was no official notification of the Department of the Attorney
General that the patient could be returned to the courts. The new
legislation requires such reports, not only for remands under the
CriminalCode, but also pursuant to persons who are transferred to
the facility under the Penitentiaries Act 2 5 or the Prisons and
6
ReformatoriesAct of Canada. 2
X. Civil Rights
The legislation attempts to protect civil rights by three means. The
first is by a complicated system of renewal documents which are
required at specified intervals following a patient's detention with
27
each document requiring a review of the case.
The second is a list of very specific rights, including the right to
send and receive letters, the right to make and receive phone calls,
28
visiting rights and the right to counsel.
23. Id. at s. 26(1)
24. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 465(l) (c)
25. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6, s. 19(2)
26. R.S.C. 1970, c.P-21,s.25
27. Hospitals Act, S.N.S. 1977, c. 45 (to come into force April 1, 1979 with the
exception of s. 8 of c. 45 which came into force Dec. 29, 1977, and except s. 4 of
c. 45 O/C 79-12 [9 Jan. 1979]).
28. Id.at s. 62
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The third method is by means of a review by an outside review
board, 29 as well as the right to have any matter reviewed by a
County Court. 30 Reviews can take place with respect to the person's
detention, as well as any decisions relating to the individual's
capacity to consent to treatment of his competency to manage his
own affairs. In addition to a review at the request of the patient, the
legislation is unique in that it requires a review by the Review Board
every six months for the first two years of detention and at least
once every twelve months thereafter, regardless of whether or not
the patient requests the review. 3 1 It is hoped that this provision will
be one of the strongest elements to guard against any unjustified
detention.
The fourth provision relating to civil rights provides for the right
to legal counsel at all stages, and in connection with any matter
32
which is of concern to the patient.
Because of public concern regarding psychosurgery, there are
33
also specific provisions relating to such procedures.
XI. Consent to Treatment
The entire problem of consent to treatment for mentally ill patients
has long been one which has plagued psychiatric institutions. Under
the common law, an individual can only consent to treatment if he is
mentally capable of understanding the nature and the risks of the
procedure and the risks of not undergoing the procedure. These
criteria have now been specifically outlined in legislation. 3 4 If an
individual is not being detained and treated by force of legislation
there are no legislative provisions which can overrule the necessity
for his consent, except in an emergency in which the patient is
incapable of consenting. In cases in which he is unable to consent
because of his mental disability, and this would not apply to a great
number of psychiatric patients, it would have been necessary to
make an application to a court to have the individual declared
incompetent and a guardian appointed. 3 5 From an administrative
point of view, this is extremely time-consuming and expensive.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at s. 55
td. at ss. 39 & 50(2)
Id. at s. 56
Id. at ss. 62(8) (a) (iv), (8) (c)
Id. at s. 52
Id. at s. 44(2)
Incompentent Persons Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 135
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Where the individual is detained, it is usually possible to infer from
the legislation that treatment may be given without the individual's
consent, at least for procedures required for the purpose for which
he was detained.
Legislation has seldom dealt effectively with the individual who
is incapable of consenting apart from these situations. Since for
minor procedures it would delay treatment to make a court
application, a legislative response was required. The new legislation
does this by requiring a psychiatrist, having examined a person in
the hospital, to determine his capacity to consent to treatment and to
complete a declaration of capacity.36 If he has been found incapable
of consenting to treatment he may be treated after obtaining the
consent of his guardian, if he has one, or if he has no guardian, upon
obtaining the consent of his spouse or next of kin, or where the
spouse or next of kin is not available, or consent is unable to be
obtained, upon obtaining the consent of the Public Trustee. 37 This
procedure is not restricted to individuals who are confined in
psychiatric hospitals, but extends to patients in all hospitals.
XII. Competency to Administer an Estate
At the same time that the psychiatrist determines the patient's
capacity to consent to treatment, he is also required to determine
whether the individual is competent to administer his estate. 38 A
psychiatrist completes a declaration of competency in which he
39
states his opinion, based on the criteria outlined in the legislation.
If the individual is unable to administer his estate, and the
circumstances are such that the Public Trustee should immediately
assume management of the person's estate, the administrator of the
hospital shall notify the Public Trustee as soon as possible. The
Public Trustee may then take possession of the property and effects.
As with the declaration of capacity, this declaration also must be
performed at least once every three months for the first year and at
least once every twelve months therafter.4 0 This provision also
overcomes the difficulties of obtaining a declaration of incompetency from a court, which is time-consuming and often results in the
wasting of an individual's property in the interim.
36. Hospitals Act, S.N.S. 1977, c. 45, s. 45(1)

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at s.
at s.
at s.
at s.

46(2)
45(3)
44(3)
47
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XIII. Standards
While it is impossible to build standards into legislation if the
facilities, financial resources and personnel are not available,
certain restrictions were built into the legislation to make certain
that at least minimum standards are maintained. The first of these is
that any decision with respect to an individual's detention, his
capacity or his competency can only be made by a psychiatrist,
rather than a general practitioner, within the hospital. The
legislation defines a psychiatrist as a person who is recognized as a
specialist in psychiatry by the Provincial Medical Board or who on
or before the 31st day of December, 1977 is eligible to write for a
Canadian Fellowship in Psychiatry of the Royal College of
41
Physicians and Surgeons (Canada).
The second standard of note concerns psychosurgery. 42 No
psychosurgery shall be performed unless the patient to be treated
has been assessed at a facility designated by regulation. There will
be very few facilities that will be given the authority to do such
assessments. Furthermore, the psychosurgery must be recommended by a psychiatrist who is treating the patient at the facility,
along with two psychiatrists who are not associated with the facility
where the patient to be treated has been assessed. In addition, the
psychosurgery can only be performed at a hospital designated by the
Governor in Council. Such designations will be very restrictive. In
addition, all psychosurgery will have to be reviewed by the review
board to determine whether there is compliance with the
requirements of the legislation before it is allowed to proceed.
XIV. Conclusion
The new Hospitals Act cannot be regarded as a successful
breakthrough in the field of mental health until it has been in
operation for several years. At that time it will be necessary to
determine whether the percentage of involuntary patients has
decreased significantly. A study will be required of the appeals to
the Review Board and the courts to determine whether patients are
being deprived of their basic rights improperly. Equally, studies
should be made to determine whether the law is interfering with the
individual's need for treatment, care and protection.
41. Id.at s. 1(5)
42. Id.at s. 52
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Most important of all however, it will be necessary to determine
whether the attitudes of the public and those who work in
psychiatric services are in accordance with the spirit of the law.
Without such support, the legislation will have broken new ground
on paper only.

